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Abstract 
 
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are used to protect United 
States (U.S.) military technologies.  However, changes to ITAR export controls regarding 
space technologies have had a major impact to the U.S. space industry.  The literature 
mentions a concern for the health of lower-tier firms because they are a major source of 
innovation, but there is no additional information considering the effects of ITAR on 
space innovation at those lower tiers.  The purpose of this thesis was to explore the 
implications of continuing the current ITAR restrictions with regard to innovation in the 
space industry.  This research used a three-part approach: Part I used personal interviews 
to explore perceptions from the space enterprise.  Part II was a secondary analysis of 
previously collected data. Part III compared the results of Parts I and II to assess the 
relationship between ITAR and innovation in the space industry.  The analysis shows 
there is no significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on space innovation.  
However, the industry may see some secondary negative effects on innovation.  This 
thesis reveals a need to examine other second or third order effects of ITAR in economic 
and political environments to advise current ITAR reform efforts.   
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EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF  
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS  
ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The motivation for this research stems from a desire to understand how the U.S. 
manages its National Security Space Enterprise.  Personal observations from the 
Schriever V Wargame of 2009 discovered some concerns with the policies, doctrine, and 
laws our space leaders use to manage the enterprise.  Early discussions revealed that the 
topic is extremely complex and existing guidance documents are intentionally vague.  
However, many of these discussions also included complaints about the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  These complaints led to the general question – 
How does ITAR affect space?   
The U.S. Government established ITAR to protect U.S. military technologies.  
The current implementation of ITAR in the case of space technologies is hampering the 
growth of the U.S. space industry in the global market.  The U.S. maintains a lead in 
space technology, but space innovation outside the U.S. has increased.  Foreign 
companies are now developing ITAR-free satellites, signaling a decreasing dependence 
on U.S. technology.  The purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications of 
continuing the ITAR restrictions that may be detrimental to U.S. space capabilities.  If 
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ITAR has a negative effect on U.S. space innovation, future U.S. space solutions may not 
be superior to foreign technologies.  With less superior solutions available to meet future 
requirements, the U.S. risks losing its long-standing space superiority.  The U.S. must 
continue to foster space innovation to enable U.S. companies to compete in the global 
space market.    
 
Background on ITAR and Space 
Congress first implemented the International Traffic in Arms Regulations in 1976 
under the Arms Export Control Act, found in Title 22, Chapter I of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Sections 120 through 130.  The purpose of ITAR is to prevent sensitive 
technology from reaching parties hostile to the U.S.  As stated in ITAR, Executive Order 
11958 delegated authority to the Department of State to regulate the export and import of 
defense articles and defense services (U.S. Congress 2009) which may include hardware, 
technologies, and services.  The Department of Defense (DoD) captures and manages 
these items in the U.S. Munitions List (USML).  Furthermore, two categories in the 
USML compose nearly all applicable material for space, Category IV – Launch Vehicles 
and Category VIII – Spacecraft (U.S. Congress 2009).  When first enacted, this collection 
of regulations was extremely important to protect military technology, especially space 
technology, from leaking out of the country to hostile governments such as our Cold War 
rival, the Soviet Union.  ITAR protected all military space systems because each system 
was unique to the mission for which it was designed.   
With the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S. began to look more at international 
space ventures.  To that end, in 1988, President Ronald Reagan “lifted the ban on the use 
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of Chinese launch vehicles for commercial satellites” and President George HW Bush 
“made a similar decision with regard to Russia.”  In line with the Presidents’ willingness 
to trade with the two rivals and increasing openness to international space ventures, in 
1992 “the State Department transferred jurisdiction of some commercial communications 
satellites to the Department of Commerce” (Space Foundation 2008).  By 1996, 
commercial communications satellites were fully transferred “under the purview of 
Commerce’s less restrictive [Commerce Control List] CCL” (Taylor 2007).  However, it 
should be noted that “the State Department continued to control the related 
communications technologies and the rest of the space items on the USML remained 
under its jurisdiction” (Space Foundation 2008).  By taking such an action, the U.S. 
government was working to reduce the limitation of ITAR on exporting technology by 
attempting to separate non-military space technology from military.   
In 1995 and 1996, investigations of two failed launches using the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) lift vehicles to carry U.S. commercial satellites led to a breach 
of ITAR as discovered by the Cox Commission in 1996.  Below is a summary of the 
incident and the commission’s findings:  
Following the catastrophic launch failure of a Chinese Long March 3B rocket 
carrying the U.S.-built Intelsat 708 satellite, an Independent Review Committee 
composed of Loral and Hughes Space & Communications engineers met with 
PRC engineers to review the failure analysis performed by the Chinese.  The 
Independent Review Committee took issue with the findings of the report, and 
therefore issued their own Preliminary Report, documenting two other potential 
failure points and recommending further testing. 
 According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), evidence suggests 
that the Independent Review Committee very likely led the PRC to discover the 
true source of failure of the rocket.  The DOD also concluded that “Loral and 
Hughes committed a serious export control violation by virtue of having 
performed a defense service without a license…” (U.S. House of Representatives 
1999)  
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Because of the commission’s findings, the companies involved were fined a total of 65 
million dollars.  Furthermore, the Department of Commerce returned jurisdiction to the 
Department of State as “all satellites and satellite technologies were once again placed on 
the USML and exports were governed by ITAR” (Space Foundation 2008).  Since this 
transition of jurisdiction, the government has not significantly altered ITAR in terms of 
space technology.  
 
Importance of the Industrial Base 
Several studies have researched the effects of ITAR on the U.S. industrial base 
because the DoD holds a strong interest in understanding the state of the defense 
industrial base.  This resource is vital to maintain the ability to produce military 
capabilities and provide surge support when needed.  Evidence of the importance the 
DoD places on the Defense Industrial Base is seen in examples such as the Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD-IP), the Annual 
Industrial Capabilities Report submitted by DoD to Congress, the Defense Contract 
Management Agency’s Industrial Analysis Center, and established councils at the joint 
level and service level.  All of these examples have the primary goal of maintaining 
awareness of issues affecting the industrial base so that the DoD may leverage the 
industrial base effectively to meet warfighter needs.  The councils and reports study and 
address issues such as globalization; manufacturing and engineering expertise; eroding 
U.S. leadership in science, technology, and engineering; the aging workforce; and DoD 
policies and requirements. 
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Space Industrial Base  
The U.S. continues to lead the world in space technology development, but the 
current domestic demand is not sufficient to sustain the U.S. space industry (AFRL 
2009).  Access to the global space market will result in growth for the U.S. space 
industry.  However, any transaction with a foreign country involving space technology 
requires ITAR approval.  This is typically not a problem for large companies with 
established export programs.  There is, however, a greater impact to small firms due to 
the resources required for registration and maintaining a compliance infrastructure.  
Because smaller companies are considered to be a major source of innovation (Space 
Foundation 2008), the combination of barriers to their participation in the global market 
and the low domestic demand for space technologies may result in less opportunities for 
space innovation in the U.S.  This could lead to the conclusion that ITAR is stifling U.S. 
space innovation.  While space innovation may be suffering in the U.S., space innovation 
is increasing overseas, and the U.S.’s dominance in space technology may be losing its 
edge.  Companies outside the U.S. are now developing technologies and components 
traditionally supplied by the U.S., thus creating more competition.  ITAR raises barriers 
for competition in the global space market.  One reason for barriers raised by ITAR is 
that the export license process takes too long.  Foreign governments are able to take 
advantage of these barriers to keep economic benefits within their own nations.  For 
example, they may intentionally set shorter deadlines for contract proposals which they 
know U.S. companies will not be able to meet due to the lengthy ITAR licensing process 
(Space Foundation 2008). 
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Problem and Purpose Statement 
Since 1999, when all space technologies returned to the protection of ITAR, 
several published articles and studies address the effects of those international restrictions 
on the U.S. Space Industrial Base (SIB).  Statements and comments refer to a concern for 
lower-tier firms because they are a major source of innovation.  The literature, as 
reviewed in Chapter II, provides no additional information considering the effects of 
ITAR on space innovation at lower tiers.  Therefore, this research investigates the 
following questions: 
1. What are the effects of ITAR restrictions on innovation in the U.S. SIB? 
 
2. Are there any indications that innovation in the SIB is declining since stricter 
ITAR restrictions were imposed in 1999?  If so, what are they? 
 
3. What is the perception of the health of innovation in the SIB from space leaders in 
government and industry? 
 
This research explores the connection between ITAR and its effects on space 
innovation.  This study does not detail various flaws of ITAR or recommend changes to 
existing export policies; however, it considers potential unintended consequences or 
second-order effects of ITAR with a focus on innovation in the U.S. space industry. 
 
Methodology 
This study evaluates the research questions using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. The overall framework includes three parts (1) data collection 
through interviews of government and industry representatives, (2) a secondary analysis 
of existing data, from a 2007 space industrial base survey by the Department of 
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Commerce, and (3) a comparison analysis between the interviews and the existing data.  
The methods used include data coding and theme development for interviews and 
secondary analysis of data from the survey. 
 
Summary 
This chapter introduced the topic of this thesis with background information on 
ITAR and its connection to the space industry, a summary of the importance of the 
industrial base, and a look at the space industrial base.  Chapter II  presents an in depth 
literature review of national policies relevant to space and export controls, commissioned 
studies along with articles and editorials looking at ITAR and the space industrial base, 
and relevant innovation concepts.  Chapter III provides a detailed description of the 
research methodology that covers a three-part framework, including data collection 
through interviews, a secondary analysis of existing data, and a comparison analysis 
between the interviews and the existing data.  Chapter IV presents the results of the data 
analysis.  Finally, Chapter V provides conclusions and outlines recommendations for 
further research.    
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II. Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents the relevant supporting information for this research found 
in existing literature based on four sub-topics: Policy, Commissioned Studies, Articles 
and Editorials, and Innovation.  The final paragraphs outline the gap in the literature on 
which this research focuses. 
 
Policy 
The United Nations (UN), realizing the great prospects of space exploration for 
mankind, drafted a treaty in 1967, commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, to 
ensure that the exploration and use of outer space would be for peaceful purposes and for 
the benefit of all people and countries irrespective of their economic or scientific 
development (United Nations 1967).  The treaty also encourages international 
cooperation for scientific investigation in outer space.  The development of technologies 
to explore and use space requires significant investment of financial and intellectual 
capital.  Only a few governments committed to this investment at the beginning of the 
space race.  However, additional nations (not as economically developed) have become 
players in the space business by forming consortia to combine their limited resources and 
benefit from the continuously increasing prospects of space. 
The U.S. established the National Space Policy (NSP) in 1978 and periodically 
updates it as political and economic climates change.  The release date of the most recent 
version of the NSP is June 28, 2010; however, this research references the 2006 version 
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(National Space Policy 2006).  The NSP continuously aligns with the United Nations’ 
treaties and principles on outer space.  Moreover, the NSP outlines additional principles 
to strengthen and secure the nation’s space leadership.  One of the guiding principles 
found in this policy states that the U.S. “is committed to encouraging and facilitating a 
growing and entrepreneurial U.S. commercial space sector” (National Space Policy 
2006).  This statement recognizes the need to encourage space innovation as a significant 
contribution to the U.S. economy.  Furthermore, specific fundamental goals in the NSP 
emphasize the U.S. desire to remain a major player in space.  The first goal relates to the 
need to maintain the U.S. space industrial base to “ensure that space capabilities are 
available in time to further U.S. national security…”  Another goal is to “Enable a 
dynamic, globally competitive domestic commercial space sector in order to promote 
innovation, strengthen U.S. leadership, and protect national, homeland, and economic 
security…”  This goal directly recognizes the connection between innovation and global 
competitiveness.  In addition, the NSP acknowledges the importance of international 
cooperation “on space activities that are of mutual benefit and that further the peaceful 
exploration and use of space…” 
Finally, the NSP specifically recognizes a need for effective export policies.  This 
concept is crucial to supporting the fundamental goals of the NSP relating to innovation 
and international cooperation.  When reviewing export license requests, “space-related 
exports that are currently available or are planned to be available in the global 
marketplace shall be considered favorably.”  However, since the U.S. considers space 
capabilities to be vital to its national interest, exports of “sensitive or advanced technical 
data, systems, technologies, and components, shall be approved only rarely…” (National 
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Space Policy 2006).  This statement illustrates the need for the U.S. to balance national 
security with economic security to remain a global space leader. 
 
Commissioned Studies 
From 2007 through 2009, there have been at least eight studies that examined the 
health of the U.S. industrial base in general and the effects of ITAR specifically on the 
SIB.  Key findings agree across these studies with regard to the space industry.  Large 
defense contractors in the SIB are healthy, but there is some concern for key lower-tier 
suppliers (CSIS 2008; AFRL 2009).  AFRL’s 2009 Industrial Base Assessment points out 
that demand for global commercial and domestic military space systems is strong through 
at least 2012 (AFRL 2009).  Upgrade and replacement efforts for nearly all on-orbit 
assets currently under-way in the national security space sector contribute to the “good” 
financial health of top-tier manufacturers in the SIB (CSIS 2008).  However, export 
control requirements present a significant barrier to competing in foreign markets while 
there is an insufficient domestic demand to keep all suppliers operating at efficient 
capacity (AFRL 2009).  Abbey and Lane (2009) show there is a direct correlation 
between export policies, cost of compliance, and financial health of smaller suppliers.  
Furthermore, domestic sources are diminishing or are at-risk for key items such as solar 
arrays and radiation-hardened electronics (AFRL 2009).  U.S. space firms need to expand 
to the global community in order to survive. 
The concern for key lower-tier suppliers directly relates to a concern for 
innovation in the SIB.  The Space Foundation’s 2008 study on ITAR and the U.S. space 
industry states that lower-tier companies are a major source of innovation.  Lower-tier 
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companies invest a much higher percentage of internal funds as a percent of sales on 
space Research & Development (R&D) than larger aerospace contractors who rely more 
on government funding for research (Taylor 2007; NSSO 2008).  Growth in R&D 
expenditures was seen primarily in lower-tier companies as an investment in innovation 
to remain competitive (Taylor 2007).  However, the Institute for Defense Analyses’ 2007 
study mentions that U.S. commercial firms are reluctant to engage in R&D activities for 
the DoD because of potential Department of State restrictions (Van Atta et al. 2007).  
Another report states that ITAR discourages companies from supplying their best 
technologies to the DoD so that they can compete in commercial and international 
markets for potentially higher sales volume and profits (OUSD-ATL 2009). 
All the space industry studies agree that ITAR inhibits the ability to compete or 
participate in the global space community (Taylor 2007; CSIS 2008; NSSO 2008; Space 
Foundation 2008; AFRL 2009).  The uncertainty of ITAR processes and processing times 
impacts the space industry’s confidence to compete in foreign markets (CSIS 2008).  
Lengthy processing times for license requests are a major cause for loss of foreign sales 
(Taylor 2007; Space Foundation 2008).  Export control compliance costs are a significant 
burden for lower-tier firms (Taylor 2007; NSSO 2008; Space Foundation 2008).  “As a 
percent of foreign sales, the cost burden on Tier 3 companies is nearly eight times that of 
Tier 1 firms” (CSIS 2008).  Tier definitions are Tier 1 – prime contractors, Tier 2 – 
subcontractors, and Tier 3 – commodity suppliers (Taylor 2007).  ITAR makes it difficult 
to hire the best talent and also inhibits access to foreign technology (NSSO 2008).  The 
U.S. Munitions List (USML), which lists the products and services that ITAR protects, 
includes technologies that are already commercially available in other countries (NSSO 
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2008; Space Foundation 2008).  Specifically, the USML classifies commercial 
communications satellites as “munitions.”  As a result, satellite manufactures must adhere 
to ITAR licensing requirements when developing products that include any components 
also found on the protected communications satellites – these components may already be 
openly available outside the U.S. 
In some cases, ITAR has encouraged the rise of foreign space capabilities.  
Foreign competitors take advantage of U.S. export controls (Taylor 2007; Space 
Foundation 2008; Abbey and Lane 2009; AFRL 2009).  They may intentionally set 
shorter deadlines they know U.S. companies will not be able to meet due to the lengthy 
ITAR licensing process (Space Foundation 2008).  In response to continued problems 
with U.S. trade restrictions, there is a growing ITAR-free movement where foreign 
companies are funding the development of satellite components typically acquired from 
the U.S. (CSIS 2008; Abbey and Lane 2009) – “they are choosing to avoid dealing with 
U.S. export controls by not using American-made parts” (Abbey and Lane 2009).  This is 
evidence that the intent of space export controls – to prevent sensitive technology from 
reaching parties hostile to the U.S. – is not being achieved (CSIS 2008). 
Because of increasing foreign competition in the space industry, the U.S. share of 
global space markets is steadily declining (Taylor 2007; CSIS 2008; AFRL 2009; Futron 
Corporation 2009).  From 1999 to 2006, the U.S. share of satellite manufacturing for all 
communication satellites sales decreased 20% and for geosynchronous orbit 
communication satellites the decrease was 10% (Taylor 2007).  A 2009 study sponsored 
by the Satellite Industry Association indicates that the U.S. share of manufacturing 
revenues fell from 41% to 29% of the world total from 2007 to 2008 (Futron Corporation 
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2009).  This steady decline in the U.S. share of global space markets is most likely due to 
foreign companies choosing not to buy from the U.S. due to export controls and having 
U.S. components and technology designed out of satellite systems (CSIS 2008). 
Finally, U.S. space export control policy is not in agreement with the national 
space policy (CSIS 2008).  A study conducted by the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies shows specific examples where some elements of ITAR are in conflict with the 
goals of the NSP.  Table 1 captures the findings.  These findings further emphasize the 
idea that the U.S. is not achieving the strategic intent of space export controls and there is 
a continuing need to balance economic security with national security. 
 
Table 1: Conflicts between ITAR and U.S. National Space Policy 
Among the unintended consequences of ITAR: Corresponding section in U.S. National Space 
Policy: 
USML not consistent with current assessment of 
which space technologies should be controlled 
“space-related exports that are currently available 
or are planned to be available in the global 
marketplace shall be considered favorably” 
U.S. space export control regime does not match its 
goals of both enabling cooperation with allies and 
denial of capabilities to opponents.  The current 
regime does not provide policy makers with the 
nuance or flexibility needed to serve the National 
Space Policy. 
“Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain 
U.S. advantage and support defense and 
intelligence transformation; … Develop 
capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of 
action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom 
of action to adversaries” 
Satellites and their components placed on USML 
with intent to limit spread of space technology. 
Unintended consequences: encouraged proliferation 
of space capabilities; failed to prevent rise of other 
space powers; impacted U.S. competitiveness 
“Refrain from conducting activities that preclude, 
deter, or compete with U.S. commercial space 
activities, unless required by national security or 
public safety” 
Adverse industrial/technological impact to U.S.  
ITAR implementation introduces a friction for U.S. 
companies competing in the global market, as much 
as $600 million a year, which in turn feeds space 
development that the U.S. is not involved in 
“A robust science, technology, and industrial base 
is critical for U.S. space capabilities… Use U.S. 
commercial space capabilities and services to the 
maximum practical extent” 
The continuation of our legacy of beneficial 
collaboration with foreigners has been impeded, as 
has our ability to do anomaly resolution 
“Encourage international cooperation … on space 
activities that are of mutual benefit and that further 
the peaceful exploration and use of space, as well 
as to advance national security, homeland security, 
and foreign policy objectives”   
Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008 
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Articles and Editorials 
Several articles are available that address the issue of ITAR in relation to the 
space industry.  These articles primarily speak of the hardships companies in the U.S. 
space industry have faced since commercial satellites returned to the USML in 1999.  
Opinions are consistent across all the articles. 
The main concern is that instead of protecting U.S. national security interests, the 
export policy has closed off a profitable export industry.   “The result has been the 
deliberate development by overseas manufacturers of … devices and systems that are the 
equivalent of American technologies … not subject to ITAR” (Wheatley 2009).  Even in 
the case of U.S. dual-use technologies, export restrictions do not have any impact on 
what other nations are able to sell (Dinerman 2005).  Dinerman (2008) poses a relevant 
question: How does a superpower balance the needs of its national security system and its 
need to trade?  The majority of the articles reiterate the fact that ITAR has negatively 
affected the U.S.’s participation in the global space market.  Foust (2005) points out that 
since oversight of satellite technology exports was transferred to the State Department, “it 
has become far more difficult for U.S. companies to sell satellites and satellite 
components to customers outside the [U.S.], even to friendly nations such as Canada and 
Britain.”  Global competition has grown and U.S. companies are finding it difficult to 
compete with foreign companies offering ITAR-free satellites.  Contractors around the 
globe have the option of acquiring equivalent technologies from companies outside the 
U.S.  Wheatley (2009) provides two specific examples: (1) Canada has specifically cited 
ITAR as a reason for selecting European satellite builders and (2) EADS Sodern, a 
French company, is phasing out its American supplier base.   
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According to Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA), even the intelligence 
community is finding it difficult to source satellite-related components domestically 
(Space Politics 2009).  This leads the reader to question the superiority of U.S. space 
technologies and components when compared to what is available in the global market. 
The most popular recommendation to remedy the frustrations of the U.S. space 
industry is to review and revise the USML to exclude technologies which are readily 
available as commercial-off-the-shelf technologies around the globe (Kusiolek 2008; 
Boucher 2009).  Despite their widespread commercial availability, the USML classifies 
communications and other commercial satellites as “weapons systems” (Dinerman 2008).  
“Screws, lithium-ion batteries, simple rivets – if they have a defined space application, 
their export is banned, or subject to ITAR’s burdensome licensing applications and 
controls” (Wheatley 2009). 
Another suggestion is to re-establish a multilateral Cold War organization called 
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) (Dinerman 2008; 
Knes 2010).  The CoCom brought together 17 member states, including the U.S., its 
NATO allies, Japan, and Australia, in an informal setting where they could agree on what 
exports they would allow.  “The organization’s extreme discretion and its lack of a 
formal legal structure insured that no nation could publicly lose face” (Dinerman 2008).  
The main point of Dinerman’s suggestion is to find a way for the U.S. to treat its close 
allies as trusted friends with regard to trade.  
The lengthy and unpredictable ITAR process takes much of the blame for foreign 
contractors phasing out U.S. suppliers for satellites and satellite components.  Pierre 
Chao, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that 
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interest in ITAR-free satellites is prompted “by the uncertainty embodied with the U.S. 
ITAR system” (Space Politics 2009).  This uncertainty refers to delays in getting 
approvals for export licenses and related agreements.  There is acknowledgement of some 
progress with the ITAR process.  For example, the State Department is already starting to 
process export license applications more rapidly (Space Politics 2009) – requiring 
decisions to be made within 60 days  of the application (Dinerman 2008).   
The literature proposed several recommendations to fix this lengthy process.  One 
recommendation considers a two-tier approach that would treat exports to allied countries 
in a more expeditious manner (Foust 2005).  This would be a way to trade with close 
allies while treating them as trusted friends.  Another recommendation is to allow space 
parts for systems that have already been exported to close allies to be shipped without 
having to go through the ITAR process (Dinerman 2008).  In addition, there are 
complaints that the State Department must enhance the transparency of the export control 
process.  This should include explanatory notes for USML categories as well as public 
release of the results of Commodity Jurisdiction requests (Boucher 2009).  Still the cost 
of compliance weighs heavily on many U.S. firms, particularly small companies, 
resulting in reduced profit margins to cope with ITAR (Dinerman 2008). 
Looking beyond commercial satellites, Foust (2005) raises concerns for ITAR’s 
effect on the up-and-coming space tourism industry.  With the uncertainty of possible 
licensing requirements, U.S. companies with designs for commercial space vehicles are 
unable to share their designs with foreign companies looking to venture into the space 
tourism business.  Foust (2005) says a worst-case scenario would be that ITAR could 
restrict who could fly on future space-tourism vehicles.  Companies may need to obtain a 
 
17 
 
license for every non-U.S. passenger because some technical information may need to be 
shared with passengers for safety reasons.  This could make it difficult for U.S. 
companies to succeed, pushing the space tourism market overseas (Foust 2005). 
 
Innovation  
 Defining Innovation. 
The literature defines innovation in various ways.  It is not simply the creation of 
a new idea.  The Cambridge dictionary (2010) defines innovation as “(the use of) a new 
idea or method.”  Chesbrough (2003) says it is an “invention implemented and taken to 
market.”  Bessant and Tidd (2007) outline three core themes of innovation, which are 
generating new ideas, selecting the good ones, and implementing them.  However, no 
discussion on innovation is complete without reference to Josef Schumpeter.  In his 1934 
publication, The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) defines 
economic innovation using five categories:  
1. The introduction of a new good or of a new quality of a good 
2. The introduction of a new method of production 
3. The opening of a new market 
4. Development of a new source of supply of raw materials 
5. The new organization of an industry 
Rogers (1998) refers to several authors to establish a definition for innovation as a 
foundation for measuring innovation.  In addition to innovation describing something 
new or improved, Rogers (1998) refers to a survey used by the Australia Bureau of 
Statistics (1996) in which innovation is defined as “any new or substantially improved 
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good or service which has been commercialized, or any new or substantially improved 
process used for the commercial production of goods and services.”  The key in this 
definition is the commercialization of something new or improved.  Rogers (1998) also 
emphasizes that new knowledge, products, or services are not innovation until they add 
value through the productive incorporation into an enterprise’s activities.  This idea is 
derived from the Business Council of Australia (1993) which defines innovation as 
“something that is new or significantly improved, done by an enterprise to create added 
value either directly for the enterprise or indirectly for its customers.”  Adding a 
timeframe to innovation, Rogers references a definition used by Phillips (1997) in which 
a firm is considered to be “innovative if it introduced at least one new or substantially 
improved product or process in a three year period.”  For the purpose of this paper, 
innovation is a new idea for a new or improved product or process, implemented within a 
three-year period, and adds value to an enterprise. 
 Measuring Innovation.  
The concept of measuring innovation is important to empirically prove or test 
innovation management concepts.  However, it has been difficult to find a record of well-
established measures for innovation.  A search of the literature reveals “a diversity of 
approaches, prescriptions and practices that can be confusing and contradictory” (Adams, 
Bessant, and Phelps 2006).  Some articles refer to proxies that have been used in the past, 
but later articles point out flaws in using those proxies.  Measuring innovation can be a 
challenge because of the broad nature of activities in the innovation process (Rogers 
1998). 
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Typically, in measuring innovation, there is a distinction between inputs to 
innovation activity and outputs from innovation activity.  Inputs relate to resources and 
include finance, human and physical resources, and the generation of new ideas (Adams 
et al. 2006).  Outputs relate to measuring the success of a firm using econometric 
techniques or other variables resulting from innovative activities (Rogers 1998).  Table 2 
is a summary of measures and proxies used to measure innovation in a firm.  The 
following paragraphs address these measures. 
 
Table 2: Measures of Innovation 
Input Measures Output Measures 
Expenditure for R&D Firm performance 
Intellectual Property Statistics/Acquisition of 
technology from others (e.g. patents, licenses) 
Intellectual Property Statistics 
Intangible assets (include goodwill and capitalized 
R&D) 
Introduction of new/improved products/processes 
Expenditure on tooling-up, industrial engineering, 
and manufacturing start-up associated with new 
products/processes 
Percentage of sales from new/improved 
products/processes 
Expenditure on marketing new products/processes Market Share 
Expenditure on training for new/changed 
products/processes 
Strategic success: growth in market share over a 
period of time 
Managerial and organizational change  
Sources: Rogers 1998, Tables 1 & 2; Bessant & Tidd 2007 
 
Expenditures for R&D is the most frequently used proxy for the level of 
innovative effort in a firm.  This is a well-understood figure using readily available dollar 
amounts.  It is typically expressed as a ratio between expenditure and some expression of 
output (Adams et al. 2006) or as a ratio of R&D to value added (Tidd 2001).  Some 
examples include total expenditure, expenditure as a proportion of sales or revenues, and 
expenditure by item (patent, organizational department, innovation or scientist) (Adams 
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et al. 2006).  Rogers (1998) points out that there may be issues with using R&D as a 
proxy for innovation because of varying definitions of R&D.  His concern is that the 
definition for R&D may be too general, “the outcome of which is new knowledge, with 
or without a specific practical application,” and does not coincide with the definition for 
innovation, which would require some practical application.  However, he suggests that 
commercial firms would aim R&D at creating innovations for commercial exploitation.  
Tidd (2001) suggests that R&D activities have a significant positive effect on the number 
of new products introduced as well as value added, which can be considered output 
measures of innovation. 
Adams, Bessant, and Phelps raise other concerns for using R&D as a proxy for 
innovation in their 2006 review of innovation management measurement.  First, they 
argue that R&D is not an adequate proxy because it is only one of several inputs into the 
innovation process.  They also argue that, even though adequate funding is a critical input 
into the innovation process, high levels of R&D funding may not be evidence of good 
innovation because they may mask process inefficiencies.  Another concern these authors 
have is that small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as service industries, do not have 
formal R&D activities, in which case, R&D would not be an effective measure.   
Knowledge management is also an important aspect of innovation.  “Ideas are the 
raw materials for innovation” (Adams et al. 2006).  Assessing the value of a firm’s 
intellectual property (IP) is a way to measure its accumulated knowledge.  Intellectual 
property can be either an input or an output to the innovation process. It is considered an 
output because the process of applying for IP rights implies that a company has created 
some new knowledge that needs to be protected (Rogers 1998).  As outlined by Rogers 
 
21 
 
(1998), IP includes patents, trademarks, design data, and the value of intangible assets.  
He defines intangible assets to be “an overall valuation for goodwill, capitalised past 
R&D, as well as valuations of any holdings of patents, trademarks and licenses” (Rogers 
1998).  Bessant and Tidd (2007) also include scientific papers in the list of IP.  Counting 
the numbers or values of patents is the most frequently used approach and has been 
widely accepted as a proxy measure for innovation (Adams et al. 2006).  The number of 
applications for patents can be a proxy for innovation output, because it represents a new 
idea to the firm even though another firm may have already registered the idea (Rogers 
1998).  Counting the number of patents granted may compensate for the weaknesses of 
R&D statistics (Tidd 2001).   
Rogers (1998) explains that using patents as a measure can be a problem for two 
reasons.  First, the existence of a patent does not necessarily mean the idea was used 
commercially.  Second, not all ideas can or will be patented, either for legal reasons or to 
prevent competitors from using this knowledge to their advantage.  The acquisition of 
technology from others in the form of patents or licenses can be an input measure.  There 
is limited study on the use of trademarks and design data as indicators of innovation; 
trademarks usually group together with patents.  The value of intangible assets can be 
used as a measure of past innovation while the change in intangible assets between two 
periods can be used as a proxy for current innovation effort (Rogers 1998). 
Rogers (1998) also addresses additional inputs to consider when measuring 
innovation in a firm.  In many cases, new products or processes may require additional 
expenditures for tooling-up, industrial engineering, and manufacturing.  Inputs to 
innovation also include marketing and training expenditures associated with new 
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products.  These inputs are crucial to innovation because of their contribution to 
developing and extracting value from new ideas.  Lastly, changes to a firm’s managerial 
methods and organizational structure may be an input to innovation.  This is difficult to 
measure and has typically been a yes-no response in survey questions that ask if there 
have been such changes (Rogers 1998). 
Several options are available for measuring the outputs of innovation.  Intellectual 
property is one measure mentioned earlier.  In addition, Bessant and Tidd (2007) offer 
three groups of output measures.  First, a firm can measure operational or process 
elements through customer satisfaction surveys to indicate improvements in quality or 
flexibility.  Next, some output measures, such as cost of product, market share, and 
quality performance, can be compared across sectors or enterprises.  Last, measures of 
strategic success, including growth in revenue or market share and improved profitability, 
can in part be attributed directly or indirectly to innovation. 
Rogers (1998) describes how outputs can be measured by the number of new or 
improved products or processes introduced by a firm or by the percentage of sales from 
those new or improved products or processes.  Counting the number of new or improved 
products is only a “crude” indicator of a firm’s level of innovation.  Estimating this 
information as a percentage of sales accounted for by new products, improved products, 
and unchanged products refines the measure as an assessment of past innovation.  The 
expectation is that highly innovative firms would have a higher percentage of sales from 
new and improved products. 
The key output measure of innovation is the success of a firm.  Proxies to measure 
firm success include profits, revenue growth, share performance, market capitalization, 
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and productivity (Rogers 1998).   Many of the measures mentioned earlier are only 
partial measures of a firm’s overall innovation ability.  Using econometric techniques to 
relate the various innovation measures to the overall performance of a firm can correct 
for this.  This is most commonly done with R&D data, using market value and 
productivity to quantify firm success (Rogers 1998). 
The space industry thrives on the expectation of continuous technology 
advancements, thus depending on a substantial level of innovation.   For the purpose of 
this research, the innovation measures described above are most applicable to technology 
development.  These are R&D expenditures, IP, the number of new products introduced, 
percentage of sales or profits from new products, U.S. market share of the space industry, 
and global market share data over several years. 
R&D expenditures are an appropriate measure because many developments for 
the space industry tend to be unique to meet specific customer needs or mission 
requirements.  However, this research will consider other measures of innovation along 
with R&D expenditures in consideration of the concerns expressed above.  Intellectual 
property is also an appropriate measure.  Realizing that not all firms have the same level 
of importance for IP, for those that make IP a priority, this measure will be a good 
indication of innovative activities.  The number of new products introduced along with 
the percentage of sales or profits from new products would be good measures for some 
firms in the space industry due to the uniqueness of mission requirements – these firms 
would introduce more products that are new.  However, for those firms that provide 
standard components not requiring unique developments, it is unlikely that data on new 
products introduced will be as prevalent.  Finally, since the purpose is to explore the 
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effects of ITAR export policy on innovation, this research considers the U.S. market 
share of the space industry in relation to the rest of the world, rather than looking at 
individual firms.  Reviewing global market share data over a period of several years may 
provide a partial indication of continued innovation activities in the U.S. space industry. 
 
Gap in Literature 
Several SIB studies express a concern for lower-tier firms because they are a 
major source of innovation.  However, there is no additional information considering the 
effects of ITAR on space innovation at those lower tiers.  The studies have done a 
thorough job in describing the difficulties faced by many firms in the U.S. SIB.  These 
difficulties include a lengthy licensing process, cost of ITAR compliance, and generally, 
the ability to compete in the global space market.  The articles and editorials further 
enumerate the shortcomings of ITAR and complaints from industry on the U.S.’s ability 
to balance national security with economic security.  However, there is no further 
mention of the effects on innovation.  This research does not intend to detail various 
flaws of ITAR, but to explore how some unintended consequences of ITAR may be 
affecting innovation in the U.S. Space Industrial Base.  
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III. Methodology 
 
This chapter provides a description of the methodology for this research that 
includes both qualitative and quantitative components.   
 
Overall Research Framework 
The overall approach used for this study, illustrated in Figure 1, combines 
qualitative and quantitative elements.  The literature review for this research investigated 
key concepts and existing studies regarding ITAR and the U.S. space industrial base as 
well as indicators of innovation.  This effort, combined with personal experience in Air 
Force space acquisition, suggested some focus areas for the current research and helped 
to form the research questions.  The main area requiring further understanding was the 
link between ITAR and innovation in the U.S. space industry, of which there appears to 
be no additional documented discussion.  As a result, an initial exploratory study 
provided insight into and comprehension of the proposed link between ITAR and space 
innovation.  This led to the development of a three-part approach:  Part I used personal 
interviews to explore perceptions from the space enterprise, Part II was a secondary 
analysis of previously collected data, and Part III compared the results of Parts I and II to 
develop conclusions about the relationship between ITAR and innovation in the space 
industry.  Using derivative data for Part II poses some concern with the danger of 
incorrectly interpreting the information collected for a different purpose.  However, the 
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exploratory nature of this research allows for the use of derivative data to provide insight 
into the situation, rather than provide definitive conclusions. 
 
Figure 1: Overall Research Framework 
 
Part I: Perceptions from the Space Enterprise 
 Interviews.  
The first portion of this research gathered information regarding key themes 
representing perspectives from various participants in the U.S. space industry, including 
small business representatives and senior government space leaders.  Data was gathered 
through interviews, using a set of specific questions to maintain the appropriate context 
for the interviews.  However, respondents had the opportunity to discuss their thoughts in 
an open-ended format in order to allow for the inclusion of additional relevant 
information that not specifically requested.  Interviews were conducted by telephone and 
in-person as opportunities allowed.  The following questions applied to all respondents: 
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1. How do you or your business participate in the Space Industrial Base? 
 
2. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on innovation in the space 
industry? 
 
3. How do you expect the U.S. space industry will evolve with the current system of 
export control policy? 
 
4. What other factors do you think affect innovation in the space industry? 
 
5. If you were king/queen for a day, what would you change? 
 
6. Do you have any additional comments regarding ITAR and the space industry? 
When speaking with industry representatives, interviews included the following 
questions: 
7. What are your perceptions of your business’s innovation capability for space 
technology? 
 
a. Since 1999, for how many patents has your business applied?  Been 
granted? 
b. Since 1999, how many technical papers have members in your business 
published? 
c. Since 1999, how many new ideas/products has your business introduced 
into the space market? 
d. Since 1999, on average, what was your percent of sales/profits from new 
products? 
 
8. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on your business’s innovation 
capability for space technology? 
 
The goal of formulating these questions was to solicit the respondents’ perceptions of 
how ITAR and innovation in the space industry may be related.  The information 
gathered from the literature review was the basis for developing the interview questions.  
The survey questions used for Part II of this research were not available until after the 
interview questions were developed.  The consolidated interview instrument is included 
in Appendix A. 
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 Sampling method.  
The target population for this research was any individual or group that 
participates in the U.S. space industry through some kind of interaction with ITAR.  This 
range of participation includes government agencies and organizations for policy 
formulation and implementation, government customers of the space industry, and 
individuals and firms in the space industry that are subject to ITAR in their businesses.  
The National Security Space Office (NSSO) provided guidance in selecting interview 
subjects for this research.  Because the NSSO collaborates across the defense, 
intelligence, civil, and commercial communities, the office is in a unique position to 
bring together senior government officials and invited guests for the Space Industrial 
Base Council to facilitate communication with industry leaders.  Also, the NSSO is 
committed to providing expert products and advice for space industrial base development 
and assessing programs across National Security Space, DoD, the Intelligence 
Community, and civil, commercial, and international space (NSSO 2010).   The NSSO’s 
focus on cross-space enterprise issues ensured consideration of the entire target 
population.  
Sampling of the space industry focused on second- and third-tier firms because 
these levels of industry are a primary source of innovation.  Industry participants were 
randomly selected from a list of lower-tier firms used in the NSSO 2008 study, “Barriers 
to Entry and Sustainability in the U.S. Space Industry.”  Purposive sampling was the 
method used to select government participants based on recommendations from the 
NSSO to guarantee representation from the appropriate government agencies because of 
the need for a specialized population (Neuman 2006; Trochim & Donnelly 2008).  
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Snowball sampling allowed a more comprehensive representation of the network of 
people or organizations involved in ITAR and space issues (Neuman 2006; Trochim & 
Donnelly 2008).  The following organizations participated in this study: 
- American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) 
- Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce 
- Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration  (NOAA) 
- Defense Technology Security Administration, Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy 
- Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State 
- National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS), 
NOAA 
- National Security Space Office 
- Office of Space Commercialization, NOAA 
- Space & Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command 
The above list does not include the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) because, generally, ITAR allows for treatment that is more 
permissive for U.S. Government agencies.  NASA is able to apply several exemptions 
listed in ITAR.  The procedural requirements document for the NASA Export Control 
Program (NASA 2007) includes a chapter which specifically addresses ITAR 
procedures.  The chapter lists eleven exemptions from ITAR that are relevant to NASA 
activities.  One specific example refers to Section 126.4 of the ITAR, which refers to 
shipments by or for U.S. Government agencies.  Paragraph (a) of this section allows for 
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the temporary export of any defense articles by or for any U.S. government agency for 
official use by that agency, or for carrying out foreign assistance or cooperative projects 
(U.S. Congress 2009).  ITAR does not restrict NASA as much as it does companies in the 
commercial industry.  
This research contains 17 interviews.  Seven of these represent lower-tier firms, 
while the remaining ten represent government or other space organizations. 
 Qualitative data coding. 
Content analysis was the method used for analyzing the data collected through 
interviews by transcribing and organizing the raw responses into conceptual categories 
using thematic analysis (Trochim & Donnelly 2008).  The analysis used latent coding 
(Neuman 2006) to extract key themes from the interviews and develop an overall 
understanding of the existing perceptions of the state of innovation in the U.S. space 
industry.  This coding enabled recognition of similar evidence in the quantitative data.  
Chapter IV contains the categories and combined data. 
 
Part II: Space Innovation Survey Analysis 
The intent of the second portion of this research was to obtain quantitative 
information based on relevant industry data.  This was accomplished through an analysis 
of data previously collected from the U.S. space industry with a focus on indicators of 
innovation in the U.S. space industry from 2003 to 2006.   
 Data source.  
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) collected 
the survey data used for this research.  In 2006, BIS, in coordination with the U.S. Air 
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Force, the NSSO, NOAA, NASA and others, conducted a survey of the U.S. space 
industry.  The purpose of the survey was to analyze the health and competitiveness of the 
space industry.  Relevant to the current research, the BIS included an analysis of the 
effects of foreign competition and export controls on the industry’s ability to meet 
defense and commercial market demands.  The survey had a 74% response rate with 
inputs received and verified from 202 space industry companies/business units.  
Respondents were characterized using tier levels where prime contractors were Tier 1, 
subcontractors were Tier 2, and commodity suppliers were Tier 3.  Tier 1 includes 
companies that sell end-products to commercial or government customers in their fields.  
Examples include companies selling satellites, launches, or satellite services.  This group 
includes emerging launch companies who are developing launch vehicles and services.  
Companies in Tier 2 provide major components and/or systems to Tier 1 companies.  
Components provided are complex and are significant parts of the end-product.  
Examples of products made by Tier 2 companies include satellite antennas and solid 
rocket boosters.  Tier 3 companies provide less complex components, sub assemblies, 
structures, and materials.  These companies also provide engineering, information 
technology, research, and custom fabrication services.  A breakout of companies by 
sector (i.e. launch services, satellite manufacturing, etc.) could provide some additional 
insights to understand the health of the space industry; however, this is not the case for 
this research because many respondent companies contributed to more than a single space 
industry segment.  Where appropriate, respondents provided data for each year from 2003 
to 2006 along with estimates for 2007. 
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In reviewing the BIS survey instrument, six survey items were selected which 
were best aligned with the indicators of innovation described in Chapter II or provided 
some context relating to foreign competition and export controls in the space industry.  
The selected survey items are included in Appendix B.  BIS provided the data for these 
items categorized according to the tier levels.  All other identifiable names or references 
were removed to protect the anonymity of the respondents.  The tier-level categorization 
is necessary for the current research because of the previously stated need to focus on 
lower-tier firms.  Specific survey items relating to indicators of innovation are #5-Space-
Related Defense & Non-Defense Sales, #20-Financials – Balance Sheet, and #22-
Research and Development.  Item #5 provided both domestic and foreign sales 
information for each year.  Item #20 specifically included a line requesting an annual 
value for “Intangibles” which refers to patents, trademarks, and goodwill.  Item #22 
requested expenditure values for basic research, applied research, and product 
development, as well as amounts from funding sources such as internal, federal 
government, state or local government, U.S. private entity (industry, universities, and 
other non-governmental organizations), or foreign investors.  The data from this item is 
an indicator of a firm’s investment in innovation, as per Chapter II. 
The survey items providing contextual information are #8-Reasons for Foreign 
Sourcing, #11-Foreign Competitors, and #18-Competitiveness Factors and Industry 
Outlook.  Information from items #8 and #11 could provide insight as to whether foreign 
sources have better technologies, quality, or prices.  Item #18 provides additional insights 
into the industry’s ability to compete in foreign markets, such as barriers to entry. 
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 Analysis. 
This analysis of the BIS data identifies trends and correlations related to the key 
themes of innovation and export controls.  It also provides an opportunity to consider any 
alternate explanations, such as political, economic, or environmental events, which may 
have affected innovation in the space industry.  Much of the data provided by BIS 
included text comments requiring coding to group them into categories using the same 
method as in Part I.  The large sample size used in the BIS survey proved beneficial as a 
few significant themes surfaced through the analysis despite some variation in the 
responses. 
 
Part III: Comparison Analysis 
The purpose of the final part of this research was to compare the perceptions 
gathered from Part I with the quantitative data gathered from the analyzed data of Part II.  
The survey data present a numbers-based picture of the state of innovation in the space 
industry.  The perceptions from government and industry space leaders are based on 
personal experiences and instincts they have developed through years of participation in 
the space enterprise.  The dynamic nature of space technology development and 
innovation in the last forty years provides a rich background on which many space 
leaders can base their perceptions.  Part III of this analysis examines whether the 
perceptions agree with the survey data and explore possible trends that the U.S. industry, 
as well as U.S. policy makers, should consider regarding current export control policies. 
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Summary 
The methodology for this research uses a three-part approach.  It includes a 
qualitative analysis of data collected from interviews of industry experts to determine 
existing perceptions, a secondary analysis of data collected from a recent survey to 
quantify the state of space innovation, and a comparison of the perceptions with the 
survey data to explore the relationship between ITAR and innovation in the U.S. space 
industry.  
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the research according to the 
framework of the research methodology established in Chapter III.  The first section 
provides a comprehensive qualitative evaluation of the interview data collected to 
establish the prevailing perceptions from the Space Enterprise.  The second section 
provides an analysis of the 2006 survey data obtained from the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security.  Finally, the interview and survey data are 
combined in a comparison analysis to provide conclusions about the relationship between 
ITAR and innovation in the space industry. 
 
Perceptions from the Space Enterprise 
The interview data was coded using content analysis, as described in Chapter III, 
to organize the raw responses into dominant themes with supporting concepts.  Because 
of the open-ended nature of the interviews, responses are not categorized by each specific 
question asked.  However, the responses fit into four themes that structure this analysis.  
The themes are “Effects of ITAR on Innovation in the Space Industry,” “Evolution of the 
Space Industry with Current Export Control System,” “Recommendations to Improve 
Innovation in the Space Industry,” and “Additional Insights for Innovation in the Space 
Industry.”  Though the sample size is small, the data collected is an appropriate 
representation of perspectives from the space community based on information gathered 
in the literature review. 
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 Effects of ITAR on Innovation in the Space Industry. 
The primary goal of this research is to explore the effects of ITAR on innovation 
in the space industry.  Respondents were directly asked to provide their perceptions of 
this topic.  The following paragraphs explain the most common responses in addition to a 
few of the unique responses.  In general, respondents said that ITAR makes U.S. 
companies less competitive in the global space market.  It inhibits our competitive stance 
throughout the world by restricting the sale of components or technologies that are 
readily available from other sources.  The effects mentioned may pertain to innovation, 
changes to business approaches, or unintended consequences.  Table 3 summarizes the 
specific groupings of responses discussed in this section.  
Table 3: Effects of ITAR on Innovation in the Space Industry 
 
Concept # of 
Responses 
% of 
Respondents 
Increases costs - High cost for compliance 9 52.94 
Timelines too long 8 47.06 
Difficult to understand the rules 7 41.18 
Hassle - too hard to work with the process 7 41.18 
Little/No effect on innovation 7 41.18 
Encourage foreign competition 6 35.29 
Unable to market/sell to foreign 5 29.41 
Stalls communication/sharing knowledge 5 29.41 
Withdraw from space industry 4 23.53 
Weak business case 2 11.76 
Avoid risk 1 5.88 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
The most commonly mentioned (52% of respondents) effect of ITAR is that it 
increases costs for space products and services.  Working in a restricted market drives 
costs up.  The primary cause for this is the high cost of compliance.  Companies end up 
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paying lawyers to figure out how to comply with ITAR.  They must also pay fees to the 
government for compliance.  Registration alone is difficult for small businesses.  A 
company must invest significant effort and funds to maintain a compliance program.  Due 
to the uniqueness of space missions, companies are not able to benefit from an economy 
of scale.  These factors add cost and overhead to any contract, making it difficult to meet 
an international price point.   
Approximately half of the total responses to this question refer to longer timelines 
resulting from ITAR requirements.  The export licensing process takes too long.  Many 
acknowledge that the U.S. has superior technology, but customers may not be willing to 
go through the involved process of licensing and subsequently choose to avoid the 
substantial waiting period.  Congress must also process the licensing request if the sale is 
above a certain dollar threshold, which most space programs typically exceed.  
Congress’s process can average approximately three months in addition to the standard 
licensing process.  Furthermore, ITAR reduced the ability to make quick deals.  It is 
difficult for U.S. companies to accommodate the quicker timelines that foreign customers 
desire. 
Over 40% of the respondents commented that ITAR has little or no effect on 
innovation.  The impact of ITAR is not necessarily in the area of innovation.  They 
explain that there is much innovation in the industry; however, ITAR complaints emerge 
when trying to market outside of the U.S. or when looking for a launch provider.  Some 
companies do not consider ITAR until after something is invented.  ITAR’s effect on 
marketing is a concept that was mentioned by 29% of respondents.  The market is more 
restricted for lower-tier businesses.  For example, a Tier 3 company can sell to Tier 1 and 
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2 businesses, but it is harder for them to sell to foreign customers. There are many 
innovative companies in the U.S., but a restricted market drives costs up and pushes the 
improvement cycle out.  ITAR may cause the innovation process to take a little longer 
while trying to stay within the rules for communication.  This is related to the concern of 
29% of respondents that ITAR affects communication and knowledge sharing.  ITAR 
hinders free technical exchange between a company and foreign engineers because a 
license is required before the communication can happen.  When marketing to overseas 
customers, a company is able to share only a very limited amount of information, which 
makes their marketing efforts ineffective.  Innovation can also occur when knowledge 
from others is shared or imported.  ITAR prevents the sharing of knowledge, which 
means the U.S. is not always able to know about others’ technologies.  The U.S. is unable 
to benefit from this input to innovation. 
Respondents also expressed great frustration with the hassles of the ITAR 
process.  ITAR has reduced the ability to make quick deals because of the timeliness of 
the licensing process and requirements such as requiring a purchase order in order to get 
a license.  A license may have many restrictions making it difficult to conduct productive 
anomaly resolution, the process of analyzing the cause of, and recovering from, hazards 
to a space mission.  ITAR hassles also turn away potential foreign customers.  Europe 
and others are moving away from ITAR components because of the hassle of third-party 
transfers.  They also choose not to buy from the U.S. because of the possibility of DoS 
disallowing the transaction because of U.S. priorities.  
Much of the frustration experienced by the space industry is due to a lack of 
understanding of the rules.  This is one of the biggest hurdles for small businesses.  One 
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respondent referred to a paranoia that causes companies to protect their technology 
needlessly under ITAR.  They need to be educated on the licensing process to overcome 
the fear or ignorance of the unknown.  Some of the confusion happens because it is 
difficult to determine when space technology is munitions.  One respondent stated that 
industry must be cognizant of consequences and risks of illicit trade and nefarious end-
use.   Another respondent commented that the best you can do is to be diligent and 
sincere in trying to comply. 
According to 35% of respondents, an unintended effect of ITAR is that it 
encourages foreign competition.  Since the U.S. cannot export many space technologies, 
foreign governments are investing in their own R&D.  On the same note, ITAR caused 
some companies to move offshore to work around the rules thus driving research outside 
the U.S.  As a result, there are many products and high-tech resources competing with 
U.S. technologies.  One respondent mentioned that India thanked the U.S. for ITAR 
because it enabled development of their indigenous space capability. 
As a secondary effect, companies may modify their business approach.  Three of 
the concepts mentioned by respondents indicate this behavior.  Because companies are 
limited to the domestic market, they are more likely to avoid risk in developing new 
technologies in order to provide mission assurance.  When considering opportunities 
beyond the domestic market, companies must balance the cost of complying with ITAR 
with the expected return.  Companies may question the worth of staying in the space 
industry.  This leads to companies choosing to withdraw either from individual projects 
or from the industry altogether.  The punitive threat of violating ITAR is so great that 
some companies are unwilling to risk questioning if ITAR applies.  They usually assume 
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that ITAR does apply and walk away from the business opportunity.  In some cases, 
companies choose to abandon the space industry and transition their technologies to a 
different industry.  In addition, many times larger companies that do not necessarily have 
a focus on innovation acquire small companies. 
 Evolution of the Space Industry with Current Export Control System. 
Looking to the future, respondents considered how the space industry would 
evolve if there was no change to the U.S.’s approach toward export controls.  The 
dominant concept, mentioned by almost half of all respondents, was that of a continued 
drawdown of U.S. suppliers (see Table 4).  Considering the number of U.S. suppliers in 
the industry has decreased since 1999, there is a threat that suppliers will not survive 
because manufacturers choose to rely on imported goods.  Companies consider leaving 
the space industry if there is a lack of market base and look towards shifting their 
business lines from space to other industries, such as medical or energy.  This can lead to 
a death spiral for critical technologies in the U.S. where there may no longer be as many 
satellites built domestically.  As a result, there is a potential secondary effect on the 
domestic launch capability – if there are fewer satellites built in the U.S. there is less need 
for U.S. launches, and U.S. space launch may slowly disappear, or in a best case, may 
provide a diminished capability.   
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Table 4:  Evolution of the Space Industry with Current Export Control System 
Concept # of 
Responses 
% of 
Respondents 
Continued drawdown of U.S. suppliers 8 47.06 
Dependence on defense/government support 3 17.65 
Continued increase in costs 3 17.65 
Hassle - too hard to work with the process 2 11.76 
Longer timelines 2 11.76 
Lost business opportunities 1 5.88 
More foreign competition 1 5.88 
Push reform of export controls 1 5.88 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
Related to supplier drawdown, 17% of respondents commented on the industry’s 
high dependence on government support.  Some may argue that the U.S. space industry is 
only lingering because of defense and government support.  Since the DoD and other 
government agencies are the principal customers of the space industry, ITAR comes into 
play for many business opportunities outside the U.S., resulting in less export 
opportunities.  With a limited domestic commercial market base and limited opportunities 
to export, the U.S. government will have to fund and manage the U.S. space industrial 
base to keep it alive. 
Respondents expect that under current export controls, costs will continue to 
increase.  Companies pass the high cost of ITAR compliance to customers through higher 
cost of products and additional overhead costs on contracts.  Respondents (11.76%) also 
expect that innovation will continue, but will require more planning and coordination due 
to the hassle of dealing with ITAR and long timelines required in the licensing process.  
There were several other expectations mentioned by respondents.  More foreign 
competition is likely because other countries will continue their technology development 
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to meet their own needs.  U.S. companies will likely have many lost business 
opportunities due to ITAR restrictions or choosing to walk away from potential sales to 
avoid ITAR hassles.  Finally, the evolving global economy along with ITAR frustrations 
will increase momentum for reform of export controls. 
 Recommendations to Improve Innovation in the Space Industry. 
The majority of recommendations provided by respondents to improve innovation 
in the space industry related to ITAR.  This most likely occurred because respondents 
recognized the overall context of this research focuses on ITAR.  In any case, 23 of the 
28 recommendations (82%) suggested changes to various aspects of ITAR (see Table 5).  
The most popular recommendation (41%) was to review and revise the USML.  Despite 
the frustration caused by ITAR, respondents unanimously agree that ITAR is necessary 
for national security.  However, the majority of them also suggest there needs to be a 
review of ITAR and the USML with a focus on determining what really requires 
protection.  This should be done by convening an industry-government consortium 
consisting of technically astute developers to identify the important technologies or items 
to be protected.  There is support for removing satellite components from the USML with 
some exceptions.  One respondent suggests creating three categories of technologies: (1) 
“in the world” – no protection is needed for these technologies; (2) “just beyond the state 
of the world” – not militarily critical technology; and (3) “critical military or intelligence 
technology” – by capability, not parts.  Further, the government must develop a process 
to periodically review and update the list every year to 18 months.  The recommendation 
(17%) to transfer items between the USML and the CCL closely relates to revising the 
USML.  When reviewing the USML for updates, it may be determined that some 
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technologies still need protection, though not under ITAR.  Depending on the situation, 
these technologies can be transferred to the CCL to be protected under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Commerce. 
Table 5: Recommendations to Improve Innovation in the Space Industry 
 
Concept # of 
Responses 
% of 
Respondents 
ITAR: Review/revise USML 7 41.18 
ITAR: Update/re-focus export controls 6 35.29 
ITAR: Clarify/simplify ITAR language 4 23.53 
ITAR: Transfer between USML & CCL 3 17.65 
ITAR: Streamline/shorten licensing process 3 17.65 
Encourage communication 3 17.65 
Provide more government funding 2 11.76 
Total 28   
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
Next, there is a need to update and re-focus export controls (35%).  The 
government has some responsibility through policy regulation to mitigate risks to security 
and manage commerce in a way that preserves the viability of the industrial base.  The 
main concern should be to keep the technological lead rather than protecting specific 
parts.  ITAR should not restrict scientists and engineers from participating in anomaly 
resolution when it is in the U.S.’s best interest.  Updates should include applying 
conditions that are more creative than just saying “no.”   
Respondents (23%) also suggest that the ITAR language requires clarification or 
simplification so that companies can have a better understanding of the rules.  Currently, 
interpretation of the law seems to be a matter of opinion; a rational interpretation is 
necessary to aid in clarifying the rules for export controls.  One respondent suggests 
putting definitions into ITAR that would clarify what the Department of Commerce 
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controls and what the State Department controls.  Another suggestion is to include a list 
of specific exclusions so that companies do not need to submit a license request for all 
export items. One respondent commented, “While simplicity of language is an extremely 
important aspect of communication, there is no substitution for training and education to 
translate national policy into reality.” 
Another recommendation is to streamline or shorten the licensing process.  A 
common complaint has been the time it takes to get an export license.  As stated earlier, it 
is neither a predictable nor a timely process, making it difficult for companies to compete 
in the global market.  One respondent suggests improving the Technical Assistance 
Agreement (TAA) process by granting a general license rather than requiring the 
submission of specific questions.   
Additionally, there are two recommendations to improve innovation in the space 
industry that do not necessarily relate to ITAR.  The first recommendation is to 
encourage more communication.  In the context of this research, this includes 
collaboration with foreign governments, companies, or individuals.  Collaboration 
enables innovation by learning more through interaction with others.  One respondent 
suggests innovation is more likely to occur by having a large number of small groups 
looking at a similar problem.  This may indicate support for having more lower-tier and 
small businesses in the space industrial base.  It also considers the inclusion of foreign 
groups in innovative problem-solving.  In any case, more freedom of communication is 
necessary as it encourages innovation.   
The other non-ITAR recommendation is to provide more government funding.  
Programs to support Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) could 
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encourage a more innovative culture.  Government investments in development could 
support the U.S. industrial base and enable competition with foreign suppliers. 
 Additional Insights for Innovation in the Space Industry. 
In addition to the perceptions and recommendations provided, respondents 
provided some additional insights to consider when analyzing innovation in the space 
industry.  The following paragraphs discuss the concepts summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Additional Insights for Innovation in the Space Industry 
 
Concept # of 
Responses 
% of 
Respondents 
Limited access to best talent 6 35.29 
Foreign approach to export controls differs from U.S. 6 35.29 
Government R&D funding to stimulate innovation 5 29.41 
Understanding economics of sociopolitical environment 4 23.53 
Appropriate contracting process 2 11.76 
Encouraging space tourism 2 11.76 
Cultural shift for youth 1 5.88 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
Many believe there is a limited pool of talent available for space technology-
development projects that may in turn affect the innovation potential in the space 
industry.  It appears that some of the best and brightest individuals choose to work in 
other industries offering higher salaries or greater prestige.  Several respondents 
acknowledged that for some projects the best talent might be foreign nationals.  In such 
cases, ITAR restricts their participation in the space industry.  Some companies will not 
even consider foreign talent for space projects.  In any case, many foreign students, 
possibly some of the hardest working, are educated in some of the best universities in the 
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U.S.  Upon graduation, many of these students will not find employment in the U.S.; they 
return to their homelands and contribute to the growing competition around the globe.   
The approach of foreign nations, more specifically Europe, towards space export 
controls differs from that of the U.S.  The U.S. is the only government that controls the 
export of space technology unilaterally.  Export controls of other nations are not as 
restrictive as ITAR, allowing foreign competitors to market their goods and services 
freely to the U.S. and other customers.  Focusing on Europe’s technological 
advancement, one respondent referred to the goal which Jean-Jacques Dordain had when 
he became the Director General of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 2003 – to be 
equal to or better than the U.S.  In support of this goal, Dordain had an R&D budget 
dedicated to closing that gap.  In addition, ESA’s structure is set up as a single 
organization to combine and focus the efforts and resources of all its member states.  This 
is something the U.S., just one nation with many space goals and priorities, does not 
seem able to accomplish.   
Twenty-nine percent (29%) of respondents agree that the U.S. Government is 
concerned with the state of the industrial base; there are several programs already 
established to stimulate innovation and growth in the industrial base.  These include the 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, the R&D tax credit, and other 
funds for R&D.  Some respondents questioned whether these programs are really on track 
to help the industry.  There has been a decrease in funding for science nationally; this is 
not a good sign for R&D in the space industry that, as stated, depends primarily on 
government funds.  One respondent specifically mentioned the R&D tax credit as a good 
incentive to stimulate R&D in U.S. companies.  However, it is difficult for industry to 
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plan for and rely on this credit because it is a temporary measure, thus many companies 
do not take advantage of it.  The SBIR program targets small businesses with 
technological potential and supports them in one or two phases of a three-phase process 
to commercialize their innovations.  Unfortunately, some companies participating in this 
program struggle to make it to the third phase, which does not receive funding from the 
government.  Many times companies become entirely dependent on government funding 
and never look beyond government work.  
Another concept mentioned by 23% of respondents refers to global sociopolitical 
concerns. One respondent suggests that we have a closed market.  For example, we 
cannot sell to Arab nations because we do business with Israel; India does not buy from 
other nations; space business with China is restricted.  Still, global business opportunities 
should be encouraged because economic competition is essential for national security.  
Thus, ITAR licensing decisions should consider both economic competition and national 
security.  Economic competition, as opposed to military conflict, encourages more 
innovation. 
The way contracts are executed in the space industry may also have some effect 
on innovation.  Because many contracts usually include cutting-edge technology 
development, it is common to see “cost-plus” contracts awarded to prime contractors.  
This option minimizes the cost risk for the contractor. However, one respondent 
mentioned that sometimes the prime contractors arrange “fixed-price” contracts with 
lower-tier companies and small businesses, which is not appropriate for development 
projects.  These lower-tier companies and small businesses assume more cost risk and 
may not be willing to push their more innovative ideas.  Another complaint suggests that 
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the government contracting process is too complex and burdensome for small businesses.  
One respondent asserts the DoD should put forth more of an effort to make its 
procurement practices friendlier to small businesses that do not have teams of attorneys 
to help them navigate the process. This would enable the more innovative portion of the 
industry to continue to provide products and services to the government.  
Government requirements drive much of the space industry.  However, a push for 
more commercial space ventures would create more innovative opportunities.  
Commercial space can drive innovation, particularly in space tourism, according to 11% 
of respondents.  One respondent likens the commercial space technology movement to 
the early computer movement, where the government contributed the majority of 
investments early, which established the infrastructure.  As the relevant technologies 
became more refined, the computer industry expanded and now individual consumers 
worldwide, rather than government-funded projects, drive the computer industry.  Space 
tourism has the potential to evolve in the same way.  The government has made a 
significant investment in space technologies.  Now, savvy entrepreneurs are making 
innovative efforts to improve technologies for launch and human transportation in space.  
Perhaps a more fitting comparison may be commercial air transportation, where 
eventually the average person will be able to travel in and through space just as easily as 
traveling between continents on Earth. 
One respondent mentioned a very interesting perspective on modern day 
innovation.  He suggests we are in the midst of a “cultural shift” because of our youth’s 
exposure to technology at a younger level.  Children learn the STEM subjects earlier; 
however, they also need to be taught problem solving, which does not necessarily happen 
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in the classroom.  Adults need to encourage children to be innovative.  For example, 
children 50 years ago found a stick, a ball, and makeshift bases to play a rough version of 
baseball, while today’s children are provided the standard equipment, a baseball field, 
and coaches – there is no need to think outside the proverbial “box.”  Society should 
emphasize both STEM education and problem solving skills to encourage innovative 
thinking.   
 
Space Innovation Survey Analysis 
The Commerce Department’s survey data used for this research is grouped in two 
categories, context and innovation indicators.  The analysis of the context sets the 
background for the relationship to export controls such as ITAR.  Then a discussion of 
the indicators of innovation follows to understand the state of innovation in the space 
industry. 
 Context for foreign competition and export controls. 
Survey item #8 asked respondents to identify all the reasons for procuring 
products or services from foreign vendors.  Response options were as follows:  Better 
quality, Not made in the U.S., Less expensive, Better technology, Business relationship, 
Trade offset, Service after sale, Foreign subsidies, Customer preference, and Other.  The 
responses selected most frequently were: Not made in the U.S. (19.18%), Less expensive 
(17.89%), Better technology (15.52%), Business relationship (14.66%), and Other 
(12.93%).  Table 7 presents this information – each column of data reflects the frequency 
of the reason in each Tier group.  For example, 17 Tier 1 companies, 39 Tier 2 
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companies, and 33 Tier 3 companies listed ‘Not made in the U.S.’ as a reason for foreign 
sourcing.  These numbers, when combined, represent 19.18% of all responses in all tiers.   
 
Table 7: Reasons for Foreign Sourcing 
Reason # Responses % Responses # Responses by Tier 
     Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
Not made in the US 89 19.18% 17 39 33 
Less expensive 83 17.89% 19 41 23 
Better technology 72 15.52% 10 25 37 
Business relationship 68 14.66% 10 35 23 
Other 60 12.93% 5 30 25 
Customer Preference  39 8.41% 5 14 20 
Better Quality  34 7.33% 2 17 15 
Service After Sale  17 3.66% 0 5 12 
Trade Offset  1 0.22% 0 0 1 
Foreign Subsidies  1 0.22% 0 0 1 
Total 464 100%       
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers. Total # of 
respondents in Tiers: Tier 1 = 40, Tier 2 = 82, Tier 3 = 80 
 
Approximately half of “Other” responses mention that there is no known 
domestic source available.  This adds more weight to the top response – Not made in the 
U.S.  This could indicate an opportunity for U.S. companies to establish a domestic 
source.  However, the business case may not be worth the effort and resources required 
unless the company could compete globally. 
Survey item #11 asked respondents to list the top ten directly competing foreign 
products or services and to specify which factors make the foreign producers competitive.  
The eleven listed factors are as follows:  Cost, Product performance, Product quality, 
Access to raw materials, Bonus features/services, Delivery time/scheduling, Foreign 
exchange, Export licensing requirements, Trade/offset arrangements/subsidies, Ability to 
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pay bribes/kickbacks, and Other.  Each respondent listed ten items resulting in 2022 
items with competitiveness factors.  The Top 5 factors making foreign producers’ 
products competitive (see Table 8) are Export licensing requirements (listed 256 times), 
Cost (154), Trade/offset arrangements/subsidies (87), Product performance (84), and 
Other (76).  The most common reason listed under “Other” was a Preference for 
indigenous/domestic sources or capabilities (listed 32 times for Tiers 2 & 3). 
 
Table 8: Top Five Factors for Competitive Foreign Products 
Factor # of 
occurrences
% of total 
responses 
Export licensing requirements 256 12.66 
Cost 154 7.62 
Trade/offset arrangements/subsidies 87 4.30 
Product performance 84 4.15 
Other 76 3.76 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
Survey item #18 contained five sub-questions and considered competitiveness 
factors in the space industry.  Specifically, the survey item looked at companies’ past and 
planned actions to improve their competitiveness, possible U.S. Government actions to 
improve their competitiveness, effects of government expenditures, and barriers to entry 
in foreign countries.  The question regarding government expenditures did not provide 
relevant inputs for this research and therefore is not discussed.  There were 183 responses 
to survey item #18; some responses included multiple actions.  Respondents were asked 
for actions taken in the last five years as well as actions they plan to take in the next five 
years to improve competitiveness.  For both periods, the top three actions are (see Tables 
 
52 
 
9 and 10): technology and product development, process improvements, and managing 
costs.  Some ITAR-related actions appeared for the previous five-year period and focused 
mainly on hiring or training ITAR expertise.  However, plans for the next five years 
included more attention towards improving competitiveness by overcoming or “working 
around” ITAR restrictions.  Some examples of actions planned to take include 
repackaging product lines to remove ITAR restrictions, lobbying to revise ITAR, 
acquiring or merging with foreign companies to establish a foreign affiliate not subject to 
ITAR restrictions, and at the extreme, withdrawing from or avoiding space-related 
business.  
 
Table 9: Past Actions (Last Five Years) to Improve Competitiveness 
 
Action # of 
occurrences 
% of total 
responses 
Technology and product development 32 17.49 
Process improvements 27 14.75 
Manage costs 27 14.75 
Train/hire ITAR expertise 2 1.09 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
Table 10: Future Plans (Next Five Years) to Improve Competitiveness 
 
Action # of 
occurrences
% of total 
responses 
Technology and product development 39 21.31 
Process improvements 29 15.85 
Manage costs 18 9.84 
ITAR-related actions 8 4.37 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers 
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With regard to government actions, respondents provided suggestions for changes 
the Federal Government could implement to improve their competitiveness.  The 
overwhelming majority (52%) of suggestions referred specifically to ITAR or export 
controls (see Table 11).  The most common suggestion was to review the USML and 
remove items from the list.  One respondent commented that the “U.S. has too many 
restrictions for potential friendly government purchasers making it a better choice for 
them to select a non-U.S. supplier.”  The subsequent most common suggestions were to 
improve throughput times for TAA and export licenses and to streamline licensing 
procedures. 
 
Table 11: Suggested U.S. Government Actions to Improve Competitiveness 
Action # of 
occurrences
% of total 
responses 
ITAR-related responses 95 51.91 
Review/remove items from USML 27 14.75 
Improve throughput time for licenses 19 10.38 
Streamline licensing procedures 14 7.65 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
The most insightful part of this survey item was the request for the five most 
significant barriers companies face when attempting to market products in foreign 
countries.  The most common barrier listed is ITAR and export controls, cited in 162 
responses (see Table 12).  ITAR was as a barrier for 23 of the 30 countries mentioned in 
the numerous responses.  Another common barrier is a foreign country’s bias toward its 
own domestic suppliers. 
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Table 12: Barriers to Entry in Foreign Countries 
Action # of 
occurrences 
% of total 
responses 
ITAR-related responses 162 88.52 
Bias toward domestic suppliers 36 19.67 
EU limitations on foreign content 5 2.73 
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers 
 
 Indicators of innovation. 
Survey item # 20 (line a) allowed respondents to place a monetary value on 
patents and trademarks.  The assessment used both business unit and corporate figures.  
At least 70 (or 35%) of the 202 respondents recorded "Intangibles" in each financial 
reporting year.  In any given year, the average value of "Intangibles" was two to three 
times the "Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E)" line item.  This shows that 
companies that provided a response for this line considered “Intangibles,” which includes 
intellectual property such as patents and trademarks, to be very valuable.  However, the 
larger percentage of respondents did not provide data for this line, which could indicate 
“Intangibles” are a low priority for many companies.  It is also possible that companies 
did not provide this information because it may be proprietary.  Within this reported 
figure, there was no further breakout of values for patents or trademarks.  Also, tier 
breakouts were not provided for this survey item. 
In survey item #5, respondents provided information on their domestic and 
foreign sales in the space business from 2003 to 2007.  Across all three tiers and spanning 
the five year period, foreign sales accounted for a very small percentage of total sales.  
Tier 1 foreign sales averaged 8.85% of total sales, Tier 2 averaged 7.10%, and Tier 3 
averaged 5.67% (See Table 13).  This indicates that U.S. companies have limited 
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participation in the global market.  It is interesting to note that there was an 
approximately 3% drop in foreign sales for Tier 1 companies from 2003 to 2004 and a 
second approximately 3% drop from 2004 to 2005.  Tier 2 companies also showed a 
slight decrease in foreign sales while Tier 3 foreign sales remained consistent.  From 
2005 to 2007, all Tiers showed an increase in foreign sales. The reason for the decrease in 
percentage of foreign sales was not directly part of the scope of this research; however, a 
possible explanation is that an increase in foreign innovation has created more 
competition for U.S. products and services, offering other options from which foreign 
customers can choose. 
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Table 13: Space Related Foreign and Domestic Sales 
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Survey item #22 solicited R&D expenditures supporting space-related activities.  
Respondents reported these values in four categories: Basic Research, Applied Research, 
Product Development, and Process Development.  R&D expenditures are primarily 
targeted towards Basic Research (42.1%) and Product Development (34.3%), followed 
by Applied Research (21.5%) and only minimal investment in Process Development 
(2.1%) (see Table 14).  Of note, survey data shows that R&D expenditures increased an 
average of 8% per year from 2003 to 2006.   
 
Table 14: Space R&D Expenditures by Year 
  
2003 
($M) 
2004 
($M) 
2005 
($M) 
2006 
($M) 
Total 
($M) 
% of Total 
R&D 
Basic Research 713 788 963 991 3455 42.1% 
Applied Research 354 477 474 460 1765 21.5% 
Product Development 721 646 672 775 2814 34.3% 
Process Development 50 48 34 43 175 2.1% 
Total 1838 1959 2143 2269 8209 100% 
 
Table 15 shows Space R&D expenditures by Tier. Tier 2 expenditures account for 
almost half (47.6%) of total R&D expenditures.  Tier 1 was responsible for 24.8% of the 
total while Tier 3 conducted slightly more R&D expenditures at 27.5%.  This evidence 
supports the idea discussed in Chapter II that the lower tiers (specifically Tier 2) are a 
significant source of innovation.  
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Table 15: Space R&D Expenditures by Tier 
  
Tier 1 
($M) 
Tier 2 
($M) 
Tier 3 
($M) 
Total 
($M) 
Basic Research 789 1627 1040 3456 
Applied Research 750 808 207 1765 
Product Development 456 1396 961 2813 
Process Development 44 79 54 177 
Total 2039 3910 2262 8211 
% of Total R&D 24.8% 47.6% 27.5% 100% 
 
Respondents also provided figures for funding received from the following 
identified sources:  Parent Company (Internal), Federal Government, State and Local 
Government, U.S. Private Entity, Foreign Investors, and Other.  The two primary sources 
are Internal and the Federal Government, each providing approximately 50% of the total 
R&D funding (see Table 16).  The remaining sources combined provided only 
approximately 1% of the total.  The substantial percentage of investment for R&D from 
internal sources combined with government sources may be considered a strong indicator 
of innovation. 
 
Table 16: Funding Sources 
 
 
Funding Source Actual % of Annual 
Total
Actual % of Annual 
Total
Actual % of Annual 
Total
Actual % of Annual 
Total
Total % of 
Total
Parent/Internal/
IRAD
 $  965 50.42%  $1,005 48.06%  $ 1,218 53.75%  $ 1,271 52.18%  $  4,459 51%
Federal 
Government
 $  927 48.43%  $1,061 50.74%  $ 1,015 44.79%  $ 1,130 46.39%  $  4,133 47%
Other  $    22 1.15%  $     25 1.20%  $      33 1.46%  $      35 1.44%  $     115 1%
2003 2004 2005 2006 Cumulative
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As mentioned in Chapter II, the most frequently used proxy for measuring 
innovation is R&D expenditures, and is typically expressed as a proportion of sales.  
Combining the data for survey items #22 and #5 provides the ratio of R&D expenditures 
as a percentage of total space sales (see Table 17).   
 
Table 17: R&D Expenditures as % of Total Space Sales 
  2003 
(%) 
2004 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
2006 
(%) 
Average 
(%) 
Tier 
Average (%) 
Tier 1 (IRAD) 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.44 
1.59 
Tier 1 (Gov't) 1.03 1.43 1.11 1.01 1.15 
Tier 2 (IRAD) 6.53 5.88 6.78 6.75 6.49 
11.34 
Tier 2 (Gov't) 5.86 4.75 4.14 4.68 4.86 
Tier 3 (IRAD) 24 22 20 19 21.25 
34.00 
Tier 3 (Gov't) 14 13 12 12 12.75 
 
 
The average values from 2003 to 2006 are: Tier 1 = 1.59%, Tier 2 = 11.34%, Tier 3 = 
34%.  The ratio of internal Independent Research and Development (IRAD) as a 
percentage of total space sales averaged as follows: Tier 1 = 0.44%, Tier 2 = 6.49%, Tier 
3 = 21.25%.  These percentages indicate a greater potential for innovation to occur in 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 firms.  The data also show the Tier 3 percentages decreasing over the 
recorded period; this could be an indication of decreasing innovation. 
 
Comparison Analysis 
This section pulls together the perceptions from the interviews and the 
quantitative analysis gathered from the survey data.  There are several key concepts that 
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correlate between the two data sources.  There are no apparent disagreements between the 
data sources – the survey data supports the majority of interview respondents’ comments.  
The following paragraphs summarize the key concepts. 
The most obvious relationship between the interview data and the survey data is 
the agreement on recommendations to improve ITAR.  The fact that ITAR-related 
responses emerged more frequently in both contexts signifies that ITAR appears to have 
an influence on competitiveness and innovation.  The top recommendations reported in 
both Tables 5 and 11 are to revise the USML and to streamline the licensing process.  
Though these recommendations may not have a direct impact on innovation, they may 
improve the competitive environment to stimulate more innovation. 
There is also agreement between both data sources on the need to stimulate more 
innovation with government funding.  As shown in Table 15, Tier 2 companies are 
responsible for almost half of the total R&D expenditures for space.  In Table 17, data 
shows that Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies use more IRAD funding than government 
funding.  Both of these tables demonstrate the high expectation for innovation to occur at 
these tiers.  Therefore, if Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies received more government funding, 
they would have more resources available with which to be more innovative.  The 
recommendation to provide more government funding in Table 5 stems from a general 
concern that science and technology is a low priority for the federal government.  This is 
echoed by the additional insight provided by respondents (see Table 6) to consider the 
effectiveness of government programs already in place to support R&D. 
Another common concern in both data sources is the apparent unintended 
consequence of ITAR restrictions – increased foreign competition.  The combined effects 
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of ITAR, as outlined in Table 3, serve to encourage foreign competition.  Foreign 
products have become more desirable because ITAR has caused increased costs, longer 
timelines, and complicated licensing requirements for U.S. products.  These factors are 
pushing innovation overseas; foreign customers do not want to deal with these 
restrictions.  Therefore, they develop their own technologies to provide the same 
capabilities.  Currently, the high cost for compliance (Table 3) is absorbed into the cost 
for space products and services.  Foreign sources are able to offer less expensive options 
(Table 7) which is one of the top factors (Table 8) making foreign products more 
competitive.  Interview respondents expect that costs will continue to increase under the 
current export control system.  However, the greatest deterrent for purchasing U.S. 
products is the hassle of dealing with export licensing requirements (Table 8).  
Unfortunately, this is not likely to change under the current system of rules (Table 4).  
With increased foreign competition and the hassles of the licensing process, ITAR is a 
major contributing factor in lower-tier U.S. companies’ decision to withdraw from the 
space industry.  Subsequently, this diminishes the available resources for innovation in 
the space industry. 
 
Summary 
The interview data revealed some key themes in the perceptions of participants in 
the space industry.  These themes were effects of ITAR on innovation in the space 
industry, how the space industry will evolve with the current export control system, 
recommendations to improve innovation in the space industry, and some additional 
insights for innovation in the space industry.  The analysis compared concepts within 
 
62 
 
these themes with quantitative data gathered from BIS’s 2006 survey.  This analysis 
presented several key concepts common to both data sources that include 
recommendations to improve ITAR, more government funding to stimulate innovation, 
and increased foreign competition as an unintended consequence of ITAR.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore the connection between ITAR and its 
effects on space innovation.  This chapter outlines the concluding concepts resulting from 
this research.  The first section provides the research conclusions as answers to the 
research questions.  The next section outlines recommendations to consider for potential 
government policy revisions. The subsequent section summarizes the limitations of this 
study.  Finally, the last section proposes future research areas to expand on the current 
topic. 
 
Research Conclusions 
Based on the comprehensive literature review and the analysis of data from 
interviews and the BIS 2006 survey, research conclusions provide are offered as answers 
to the investigative questions outlined in Chapter I along with a summary of the 
innovation measures outlined in Chapter II. 
 Research Questions. 
1. What are the effects of ITAR restrictions on innovation in the U.S. SIB? 
This research did not reveal significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on 
innovation.  The space industry has experienced some negative effects as a result of 
ITAR restrictions, such as increased costs due to compliance requirements and increased 
timelines due to the lengthy licensing process.  These negative effects hinder the ability 
to compete in the global market, thus making growth for lower-tier companies difficult to 
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achieve.  The industry may expect some secondary negative effects on innovation due to 
lower-tier companies abandoning the space industry, leaving a void in its primary source 
of innovation.  This is already a risk for key technology areas where there are only one or 
two domestic suppliers, such as radiation hardened electronics and solar arrays.  
Companies specializing in these technology areas may not be able to compete in the 
global market due to ITAR restrictions; however, foreign companies are allowed to 
compete with them in the US market, making their survival challenging.  If a company 
remains in the space industry, funds for ITAR compliance activities may be diverted from 
funds for internal R&D investments, thus reducing the potential for innovation.  
 
2. Are there any indications that innovation in the SIB is declining since stricter ITAR 
restrictions were imposed in 1999?  If so, what are they? 
The most useful indicators of innovation in the space industry are R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of total space sales and U.S. market share data over a ten-
year period.  The R&D expenditures data revealed a greater potential for innovation to 
occur in Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies because of a greater percentage of investment in 
R&D.  There was a decrease in Tier 3 percentages from 2003 to 2006, which may 
indicate a decline in innovation, but a causal relationship cannot be inferred with 
certainty. 
The market share data reveals a decrease in the U.S. share of global satellite 
manufacturing, indicating a potential decline in space innovation.  The DoD attributes the 
decrease in market share to U.S. export controls and foreign policies to increase 
indigenous capabilities (Taylor 2007).  Within this context, it is possible to assume that 
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U.S. innovation has not changed, but an increase in foreign innovation has caused the 
U.S.’s decreased market share of the space industry. 
 
3. What is the perception of the health of innovation in the SIB from space leaders in 
government and industry? 
The general perception is that innovation in the space industrial base is healthy.  
U.S. companies are able to develop products and services to meet the unique needs of 
their customers.  Interview respondents feel confident in the U.S.’s ability to innovate and 
lead the space industry with superior technologies.  However, U.S. export control policies 
threaten this ability because they limit participation in the global space market.   
Respondents expressed concern that innovation in the space industry will suffer if there 
are no changes to the current export control system.  
 
 Strength of Innovation Measures. 
Chapter II outlined six innovation measures to consider in this research.  These 
are R&D expenditures, Intellectual property, Number of new products introduced, 
Percent of sales or profits from new products, U.S. market share of the space industry, 
and Global market-share data over several years.  Of the six, this research is able to 
address four measures.  Data collection efforts were unsuccessful in obtaining enough 
information to make any judgment regarding the Number of new products introduced and 
the Percent of sales or profits from new products.   
The survey data and the interview data provided very little insight into the role of 
intellectual property in the space industry.  For 35% of survey respondents, intellectual 
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property is valued highly.  Only 23% of interview respondents provided information on 
intellectual property.  This information did not reveal any dominant opinion towards the 
value of intellectual property.  Some companies seek to publish technical papers and 
apply for multiple patents while others place little to no value on these documented forms 
of intellectual property.  Other possible explanations are that companies do not want to 
share this information, or the respondents did not know the information at the time. 
As discussed earlier, Space R&D expenditures from the survey data show that 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies spend a greater amount as a percentage of total space sales 
than Tier 1 companies do.  This leads us to assume that lower-tier companies place 
greater importance on the ability to innovate.  Interview data did not provide any 
additional insights into actual expenditures.  However, some interview respondents 
reiterated the concept that lower-tier companies are a primary source of innovation.  
Therefore, protecting this innovation capability should be a high priority for U.S. 
policymakers. 
The current research did not collect data to discuss U.S. market share of the space 
industry and Global market share data over several years.  However, the DoD’s defense 
industrial base assessment of the U.S. space industry (Taylor 2007) includes some 
relevant market share data which was collected by the Satellite Industry Association 
(SIA).  Based on SIA’s 2004 and 2006 reports, the U.S. share of global satellite 
manufacturing has decreased over a ten-year period.  U.S. market share was 63% in 
1996-1998 and dropped to 52% in 1991-2001 and to 42% in 2002-2006.  The DoD’s 
report attributes this decrease in market share in part to U.S. export controls as well as 
foreign policies to increase indigenous capabilities.  Without this context, it is possible to 
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assume that the U.S. space industry is becoming less innovative.  The more likely 
explanation is that U.S. innovation has not changed, but foreign innovation has increased, 
resulting in the U.S.’s decreased market share of the space industry.  Other explanations 
could be that the rate of U.S. space innovation has decreased or that innovation is a 
lagging indicator.  There was insufficient long-term data available to draw specific 
conclusions on the cause of the decreased market share. 
 
Recommendations  
The policy implications of this research are not solely for ITAR.  A multi-faceted 
policy approach could foster more innovation in the U.S. space industry.  This research 
led to the following recommendations for U.S. policymakers.  
The current administration already has efforts underway to investigate potential 
reforms for U.S. export policies.  Policymakers must tread carefully in these efforts 
because changes to export policies can have major effects on national security as well as 
U.S. economic growth.  The top priority is to determine what to protect and at what level 
to protect to ensure U.S. national security.  The USML requires review and updates to 
account for the current state of space technologies around the world.  If an item or a 
technology can be removed from the USML, consideration should be given to other 
export protection options such as the CCL.  Policymakers must also consider how to 
implement and enforce protections to avoid causing unnecessary barriers to industry 
growth and U.S. economic growth.  As stated, this is the primary source of frustration for 
space businesses.  The Department of State has made efforts to streamline the current 
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licensing and TAA processes, but perhaps they should consider replacing the current 
process with a new and better process. 
In addition to export policy reform, the administration should review government 
programs to encourage science and technology in the industrial base.  The intent of this 
recommendation is not to suggest the government should pay for more innovation.  
Rather, the government should structure policies and regulations to minimize obstacles 
for small businesses while protecting the rights of U.S. citizens.  For example, a 
permanent extension of the R&D tax credit would encourage U.S. companies to plan and 
invest in long-term research projects.  In addition, the government could bolster programs 
such as SBIR to target lower-tier businesses and encourage more innovation.  However, it 
is not enough just to develop a great technology.  The true benefit of innovation is in the 
implementation of new technologies – this may be where small businesses need more 
help. 
 
Limitations of the research 
The literature review presented several options for measuring innovation along 
with criticisms of some of these options.  Though justification was provided for the 
measures used in this research, the reader must consider that there are weaknesses 
associated with all the measures.  They are good indicators of the potential for innovation 
to occur, but insufficient to determine the cause of innovation.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
determine if the transition of jurisdiction for all satellites and satellite technologies to 
ITAR (referenced in Chapter I) was the cause for any observed effects on innovation as 
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measured in this research.  Furthermore, other considerations for a causal analysis could 
include:  
- The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
- The economic outlook for the space industry as well as for the nation  
- A minimal need to replace existing capabilities – perhaps the demand for 
space technology has not increased because innovation has been so good and 
has provided technologies that do more for longer 
- The possibility that negative effects due to ITAR changes have been 
underreported 
Another limitation is the use of derivative data.  This may be a concern because of 
the danger of incorrectly interpreting the information originally collected for a different 
purpose. 
 
Future Research 
This thesis reveals a need to examine other second or third order effects of ITAR.  
It is worth looking into disciplines other than space technology to investigate the effects 
of ITAR in economic, social, and political environments.  Such studies could advise the 
government’s current efforts to reform ITAR.  The following paragraphs offer four 
suggestions to fill gaps not addressed in this research and further enhance the knowledge 
base encompassing the current research. 
The current research did not collect data on the number of new products 
introduced and the percentage of sales or profits from new products.  A follow-on study 
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could focus on these measures to gain better insight as to the state of innovation in the 
U.S. space industry. 
Since this research was unable to clearly identify a direct causal relationship 
between ITAR and any significant change in space innovation, subsequent research could 
investigate contributing factors to the decrease in U.S. market share of the global space 
industry and to what degree these factors contributed. 
Further study is necessary to establish concrete measures of innovation.  If 
measures cannot be generalized to all situations, perhaps a study to present conditions for 
determining which measures can be reliably used in various situations.  Current 
innovation measures indicate the potential for innovation to occur or whether innovation 
is actually occurring.  However, the literature provides confusing and contradictory 
guidance on the validity of these measures.     
The broader industry environment could benefit from an investigation of 
government policies, laws, and regulations that affect innovation in the U.S. industrial 
base.  This study should explore whether current policies hinder innovation, distinguish 
which policies encourage innovation, and consider which policies can be helpful with 
some revisions. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the concluding thoughts resulting from this research.  
There is no significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on space innovation.  
However, the industry may experience some secondary negative effects on innovation.  
Recommendations to policymakers include reforming the overall U.S. export policy 
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approach and strengthening government programs that support STEM disciplines.  
Though some limitations of this research exist, there are several topics worthy of 
consideration for follow-on research efforts.    
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Appendix A: Interview Instrument 
 
 
1. How do you or your business participate in the Space Industrial Base? 
 
2. What are your perceptions of your business’s innovation capability for space 
technology? 
 
a. Since 1999, how many patents has your business applied for?  Been granted? 
 
b. Since 1999, how many technical papers have been published by members in 
your business? 
 
c. Since 1999, how many new ideas/products has your business introduced into 
the space market? 
 
d. Since 1999, on average, what was your percent of sales/profits from new 
products? 
 
3. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on your business’s innovation 
capability for space technology? 
 
4. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on innovation in the space industry? 
 
5. How do you expect the U.S. space industry will evolve with the current system of 
export control policy? 
 
6. What other factors do you think affect innovation in the space industry? 
 
7. If you were king/queen for a day, what would you change? 
 
8. Do you have any additional comments regarding ITAR and the space industry? 
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Appendix B: Selections from BIS 2006 Survey Instrument 
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5.                                            SPACE-RELATED DEFENSE & NON-DEFENSE SALES
Instructions:  Please provide sales data for calendar years 2003-2007 for your defense and non-defense space-related products and/or services. 
 
Note:  Total Defense and Non-Defense must equal Total in the right column.  The combination of Domestic Sales and Foreign Sales must equal Total Sales 
in the bottom row. 
 
 2003 
(in $ thousands) 
2004
(in $ thousands)
2005
(in $ thousands)
2006
(in $ thousands)
2007 (estimate)
(in $ thousands)
 Defense Non-Defense Total Defense 
Non-
Defense 
Total Defense 
Non-
Defense 
Total Defense 
Non-
Defense 
Total Defense 
Non-
Defense 
Total 
 
Domestic 
Sales $ 
 
               
 
Foreign 
Sales $ 
 
               
 
Total  
Sales $ 
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8.                                                            REASONS FOR FOREIGN SOURCING 
Instructions: For the five products and/or services cited in Question 7.b on “Foreign Procurement”, please identify ALL the reasons your Company/Business Unit 
procured these products and/or services from Foreign vendors. If your reason is not included here, provide rationale in the space provided. 
                                                                  Reasons for Procuring Products and/or Services from Foreign Vendors
                                                                                              (Check all that apply) 
# 
Product/Service 
Code 
(from 
Question 3) 
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1.   
          
2.   
          
3.   
          
4.   
          
5.   
          
Comments: 
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11.                                                     FOREIGN COMPETITORS – 2003-2006 
Instructions:  Please list the Top Ten Foreign Products and/or Services (by sales, largest to smallest) that competed directly with your Company’s/Business 
Unit’s space-related products and/or services from calendar year 2003-2006.  Also, specify what factors make foreign producers’ products competitive 
relative to your Company’s/Business Unit’s products. 
 
 [For “Code” and “Name” Please use the Product and Service Type Listing in Question 2.] 
To
p 
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n 
Fo
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n 
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/o
r 
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ic
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Product or 
Service Code 
 
 
Foreign 
Product Name 
Foreign 
Company 
Name 
Country 
 (check all that apply) 
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 b
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#1 
   
#2    
#3 
   
#4    
#5 
   
#6    
#7 
   
#8    
#9 
   
#10    
Comments:    
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18.                                        COMPETITIVENESS FACTORS AND INDUSTRY OUTLOOK
PAST ACTIONS TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS
Please describe the actions your Company/Business Unit has taken in the Last 
Five Years to improve your competitiveness in the space market? 
Comments: 
FUTURE PLANS TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS 
Please describe the actions your Company/Business Unit plans to take to 
improve your competitiveness over the Next Five Years. 
Comments:
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
Please indicate what actions, policy changes or regulatory reforms the Federal 
Government could implement to improve your Industry’s and/or Company’s/ 
Business Unit’s overall competitiveness. 
Comments:
 
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
How have space-related spending and allocations by the U.S. Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA, and other agencies impacted your Company/Business Unit in 
the following categories? 
Products and Services 
Response  
 
Personnel/Staffing 
Response  
 
Operations 
Response  
 
Please describe the strategies your Company/Business Unit has developed to respond to the above issues.   
Response  
 
 
 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Please provide the five most significant barriers to entry faced by your 
Company/Business Unit when attempting to market products in foreign 
countries.  [Note: List in order of relevance/impact; #1 is the most significant 
barrier.]  
#  Country Barrier to Entry
1.   
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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20.a                                      FINANCIALS – BALANCE SHEET  
 Instructions:  Organizations that operate as part of a larger company with non-space-related business operations should 
provide balance sheet data only for their Space-Related Business.  [Please provide estimates if actual figures are not 
available.]     
Corporate Figures represented below  
 Check  here 
Business Unit Figures represented below  
My Company/Business Unit 
operates on a:         here  
Fiscal Year  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (est) 
Calendar Year  
A.    Current Assets (in $ thousands)  
1. Cash      
2. Marketable securities      
3. Accounts receivable, net      
4. Inventories      
5. Prepaid expenses      
6. Other current assets (please specify)           
7. Total current assets      
B.    Non-Current Assets (in $ thousands)  
8. Property, plant and equipment      
 
Break-out capital 
expenditures.  [Do 
not double count 
PP&E in “Total 
Non-Current 
Assets.”] 
9. - Property      
10. - Buildings      
11. - Machinery & Equipment      
  
12. Investments      
13. Intangibles (patents, trademarks, goodwill)      
14. Less accumulated depreciation      
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15. Other assets (please specify)           
16. Total non-current assets           
17. Total assets      
C.    Liabilities and Owners’ Equity (in $ thousands) 
 D.     Current Liabilities (in $ thousands) 
18. Accounts payable      
19. Estimated tax liability (e.g., income taxes payable)      
20. Accrued expenses      
21. Long-term debt (current portion) due in 1 year      
22. Other current liabilities (please specify)           
23. Total current liabilities      
E.     Non-Current Liabilities (in $ thousands)  
25. Long-term debt (less current portion)      
26. Deferred income taxes      
27. Other long-term liabilities (please specify)            
28. Total non-current liabilities      
29. Total liabilities      
F.    Owners’ Equity (in $ thousands)  
30. Common stock      
31. Additional paid-in capital      
32. Total paid-in capital      
33. Retained earnings      
34. Less treasury stock (stock repurchase)           
35. Total owners’ equity           
36. Total Liabilities and Owners’ Equity*      
*Note:  Please report any significant one-time events on the next page of this survey.                                                                                                                      
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22.a                                   RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Instructions:  Companies/organizations whose sole focus is space-related products should report Corporate-wide R&D 
expenditures.  Those companies/organizations that are part of a larger company with other non-space-related business 
operations should report R&D expenditure figures only at the space-related Business Unit level.  Please specify whether 
you are reporting Corporate R&D figures or Business Unit R&D figures with a check  in the corresponding box. 
SPACE-RELATED R&D – EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION 
Corporate R&D   
 check  here  
Business Unit R&D   
R&D Expenditures Supporting Space-Related Activities  
(in $ thousands)
CATEGORY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (est.) 
Basic Research       
Applied Research      
Product Development      
Process Development      
Total R&D      
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22.b            SPACE-RELATED R&D – FUNDING SEGMENT BY SOURCE
Corporate R&D   
 check  here  
Business Unit R&D  
R&D Funding Sources for Space-Related Activities  
 (in $ thousands) 
CATEGORY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (est.) 
Parent Company (internal)      
Federal Government      
State and Local Government      
U.S. Private Entity [Includes industry, 
universities, and all other non-governmental 
organizations.] 
     
Foreign Investors [Includes private, industry, 
governments, and universities.] 
     
Other (please specify in box below)      
Total R&D      
Other  
 
 
Comment  
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